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A Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Under Article 15 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)1 en-
ables a commanding officer to sentence a service member who has 
committed a minor infraction2 to thirty days of correctional custody. 
1. 10 u.s.c. § 815 (1970). 
The UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970), was enacted by Congress in 1950 to provide 
a uniform system of justice for all the military services. The UCMJ lists punishable 
crimes, establishes the military judicial system under which allegations of criminal 
conduct are adjudicated, and details the procedural safeguards to be accorded an 
alleged offender. Article 36 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970), authorizes the 
President to prescribe further procedures to be used at trials, but they may not be 
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of the UCMJ. The executive orders 
promulgated under article 36 have the effect of law and are found in the MANUAL 
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter MCM]. 
2, See note 8 infra. 
1432 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1431 
The article 15 proceeding offers few procedural safeguards;8 among 
the protections lacking is the right to counsel.4 This Note will con-
sider whether the failure of the military to provide counsel at an 
article 15 proceeding is consistent with the sixth amendment,6 which 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The 
Note first will discuss the extent to which military necessity qualifies 
the application of the Bill of Rights and the sixth amendment to 
armed forces personnel. Then, assuming that military necessity does 
not bar the application of the sixth amendment to article 15 cases, 
the substantive determinants of the right to counsel-for example, 
the presence or absence of a "criminal prosecution" or "imprison-
ment"-will be discussed. Finally, the Note will examine whether 
the right to counsel demands that the accused receive the aid of a 
trained attorney. 
Article 15 was designed to provide a more efficient mode of disci-
pline than the court-martial system6 and to avoid the stigma associ-
3. See Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REv. 37, 50-52 (1965); Note, 
The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973). Examples of 
procedural rights that arc absent under article 15 arc the right to cross-examine 
witnesses and the right to be protected . from double jeopardy. The opportunity to 
examine or cross-examine is left to the sole discretion of the commanding officer. 
The service member is authorized only to indicate to the commander the relevant 
areas to pursue in questioning a witness. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-14b (Change 12, 
Dec. 1973). Article 15 punishment does not prevent the commander from prosecuting 
the service member in a court-martial for more serious charges arising out of the 
same conduct. IO U.S.C. § 815(£) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 11 128b; United States 
v. Fretwell, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 377, 29 C.M.R. 193 (1960). 
4. The right to counsel encompasses both the right to have an attorney present 
at a judicial proceeding and the right to have an attorney appointed if the accused 
is financially unable to obtain counsel. The two rights arc merged in the military 
context because the UCMJ establishes a right to appointed counsel, regardless of 
ability to pay, whenever retained counsel is allowed to be present. IO U.S.C. §§ 832(b), 
838(b) (1970); MCM, supra note I, 11 48a. This policy is also followed in situations 
not covered by the UCMJ. For example, the Manual for Courts-Martial provides 
that a person subject to a military interrogation has the right to have military 
counsel assigned to him regardless of his ability to pay. MCM, supra, 11 140a(2). 
5. The sixth amendment, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was 
enacted as a limitation solely upon the federal government. Barron v. Baltimore, 
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833). The military is under federal auspices, and thus a service 
member's right to counsel, if it exists, must be derived under the sixth amendment 
directly, without incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See also note 85 infra. 
6. There are three types of courts-martial in the armed forces: summary, special, 
and general. Summary courts-martial have jurisdiction to try all service members 
except officers, cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen for any noncapital offense 
punishable under the UCMJ. A defendant may object to a summary court-martial 
and elect to be tried by a special or general court-martial, in which harsher punish• 
ments may be imposed. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,r 16a. A special 
court-martial may try any service member for most noncapital offenses. IO U.S.C. 
§ 819 (1970); MCM, supra, 11 15a. A general court-martial may try any person subject 
to the UCMJ for most offenses, including capital offenses, and may impose harsher 
punishments than special courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970); MCM, supra, 1111 14a, b. 
The UCMJ provides the accused with extensive procedural rights in general and 
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ated with a court-martial conviction.7 Once a minor violation8 of the 
UCMJ's punitive provisions9 has been alleged to the commanding 
officer's satisfaction, he may proceed against the accused under arti-
cle 15 or invoke a court-martial.10 If the article 15 proceeding is cho-
special courts-martial. E.g., the right to appointed counsel, 10 U.S.C. § 8'1;7 (1970); 
MCM, supra, 11 48a; the right to appeal guilt or appropriateness of sentence, 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 859-76 (1970); MCM, supra, 1111 98-108. The summary court-martial is a less formal 
procedure. MCM, supra, 11 79a. However, the accused is still provided important 
procedural rights. E.g., the right to cross-examination, id. 11 79d; the right to counsel 
in cases in which the service member is sentenced to confinement, United States v. 
Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See notes 106-09 infra and 
accompanying text. -
7. S. REP. No. 1911, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2381 (1962). 
The court in United States v. Johnson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 42 C.M.R. 66 (1970), 
stated that the legislative history of article 15 indicated that two of the primary 
reasons for its enactment were to avoid damaging service members' records with 
criminal convictions and to reduce the number of less than honorable discharges, 
which arc often based on a service member's former court-martial convictions. 19 
U.S.C.M.A. at 467, 42 C.M.R. at 69. Court-martial convictions may also increase the 
maximum punishment a service member may face for future offenses. MCM, supra 
note 1, 11 127, Table of Maximum Punishments § B. An article 15 conviction cannot 
increase the maximum punishment allowed for a future offense; at worst it may 
persuade a judge to levy a sentence close to the allowed maximum. 
8. "Generally the term 'minor' includes misconduct not involving any greater 
degree of criminality than is involved in the average offense tried by summary court-
martial. This term ordinarily does not include misconduct of a kind which, if tried 
by general court-martial, could be punished by dishonorable discharge or confinement 
for more than one year." MCM, supra note 1, 11 128b. Examples of such offenses are 
absence without leave for less than thirty days, drunkenness, and assault upon other 
enlisted men. MCM, supra, 11 127c. For a case that devotes extensive discussion to 
the question of what is a minor offense sec United States v. Fretwell, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 
377, 380, 29 C.M.R. 193, 195-96 (1960). 
9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1970). See also MCM, supra note 1, 1111 155-213. 
10. MCM, supra note 1, 11 129a. Procedure under article 15 is as follows: 
The commanding officer, upon ascertaining to his satisfaction after any inquiry 
he considers necessary that an offense punishable under Article 15 has been 
committed by a member of his command, will, if he determines to exercise his 
Article 15 authority, so notify the member of the nature of the alleged misconduct 
by a concise statement of the offense in such terms that a specific violation of 
the code is clearly stated and inform him that he intends to impose punishment 
under Article 15 for the misconduct unless, if such a right exists (132), trial by 
court-martial is demanded. Also, unless prohibited by regulations of the Sec-
retary concerned, the commander may notify the member concerned of his inten-
tion to recommend to a superior commander that the member be punished under 
Article 15 for his alleged misconduct unless, if such a right exists (132), trial 
by court-martial is demanded. The notification will also inform the member 
that he may submit any matter desired in mitigation, extenuation, or defense. 
In every case, the member will be notified that he is not required to make any 
statement regarding the offense or offenses of which he is accused or suspected 
and that any statement made by him may be used against him in a trial by court-
martial. An election to accept nonjudicial punishment constitutes a waiver of the 
right to demand trial. A demand for trial does not require that charges be pre-
ferred, transmitted, or forwarded, but punishment may not be imposed under 
Article 15 while the demand is in effect. 
The member will be given a reasonable time to reply to the notification of 
intent to impose or recommend the imposition of Article 15 punishment, state 
whether he demands trial by court-martial, if that right exists (132), and submit 
any matter in extenuation, mitigation, or defense he desires to be considered. 
With respect to an offense or offenses as to which a right to trial by court-
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sen the service member is apprised of the nature of the offense and of 
the commanding officer's intention to impose punishment.11 The 
service member must also be notified that he may demand trial by 
court-martial in lieu of the article 15 proceeding;12 counsel is pro-
vided to assist him in this decision.13 The accused is not told what 
specific punishments the commanding officer intends to impose, but 
upon request he will be informed of the potential punishments un-
der article 15 and under court-martial proceedings.14 Although a 
court-martial would provide procedural safeguards lacking under 
article 15, the potential punishment is harsher.10 
martial exists but has not expressly been demanded, punishment may be imposed 
immediately by the commander indicated in the notice as the commander who 
is to impose the punishment. Punishment may be imposed only by the personal 
action of the commander or officer delegated that authority in accordance with 
128a. The member will be notified of the punishment imposed, informed of his 
right to appeal to the next superior authority, and directed to acknowledge 
receipt of the notification of punishment and to state his election regarding an 
app{~~ proceedings will be conducted in writing in all cases involving com-
missioned officers and warrant officers and in all cases in which the punishment 
includes reduction in grade, confinement on bread and water or diminished 
rations, correctional custody, restriction or extra duties for more than 14 days, 
or forfeiture or detention of pay. In other cases the proceedings may be in 
writing or may be conducted orally, following the same sequence. However, 
in any case the member may be permitted to appear in person before the officer 
authorized to impose the punishment, and that officer may personally interview 
witnesses. Any written statements or other documentary evidence pertaining to 
the case which have been considered by the officer authorized to impose the 
punishment shall be attached to the file in the manner prescribed by pertinent 
regulations. When oral proceedings are conducted, the commander will cause a 
summarized record to be made and filed. 
MCM, supra, ,r 133a. 
II. Id. The Manual for Courts-Martial does not provide for hearing until after 
the commanding officer has decided to impose punishment. 
12. Except in the case of a person attached to or embarked in a vessel, punish-
ment may not be imposed under Article 15 upon any member of the Armed 
Forces who has, before the imposition of the punishment under that article, 
demanded trial by court-martial in lieu of the punishment thereunder. He also 
has the right, in all cases, to refuse trial by summary court-martial (Art. 20: 
16a; 79d(l)). Thus, if a serviceman refuses both punishment under Article 15 
and trial by summary court-martial, he may then be tried, if at all, only by a 
special or general court-martial. 
Id. ,r 132; see id. ,r 16a. 
13. In 1973 former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed that counsel be made 
accessible to service members to aid them in deciding whether to demand a court-
martial. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Report on the 
Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces, January 11, 
1973. For an example of an implementation of this policy see Army Reg. 27-10, 
,I 3-12b (Change 12, Dec. 1973). 
14. Army Reg. 27-10, ,r 3-12c (Change 12, Dec. 1973). The other services apparently 
have no comparable regulations. 
15. Summary courts-martial may prescribe confinement for no longer than one 
month, hard labor without confinement for up to 45 days, restriction to certain specified 
limits for up to two months, or forfeiture of up to two thirds of one month's pay. 
10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970); MCM, supra note I, ,r 16b. Special courts-martial may prescribe 
bad-conduct discharges, confinement for up to six months, hard labor without confine-
ment for up to three months, indefinite forfeiture of up to two thirds of one's monthly 
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An accused who elects to proceed under article 15 may submit 
any matter in mitigation, extenuation, or defense.16 The UCMJ does 
not guarantee a right to a personal hearing,17 although the army and 
the navy grant a hearing as a matter of policy.18 Neither the UCMJ 
nor the Manual for Courts-Martial require counsel at an article 15 
hearing,19 although recent army and navy regulations allow a per-
sonal representative to speak on behalf of the accused.20 Those who 
have sufficient funds may hjre a lawyer as their personal representa-
tive. 21 
pay per month, or complete forfeiture of pay for up to six months. 10 U.S.C. § 819 
(1970); MCM, supra, 11 15b. General courts-martial may prescribe the greatest range of 
punishments, including death, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970); MCM, supra, 1114b. Compare the 
more limited punishments available to commanding officers under article 15, discussed 
in the text accompanying notes 22-24 infra. 
16. See note 10 supra. 
17. The Manual for Courts-Martial, supra note 1, is ambiguous as to the pro-
cedure for response to charges made against the service member. See note 10 supra. 
18. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-13a (Change 12, Dec. 1973); Judge Advocate General 
Manual, Revised Procedures for the Imposition of Nonjudicial Punishment (Advance 
Change No. 1, May 1973). 
19. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,r 48a. See United States v. Shamel, 
22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 47 C.M.R. 116 (1973). 
20. Army Reg. 27-10, ,r 3-13a (Change 12, Dec. 1973); Judge Advocate General 
Manual, supra note 18 (Advance Change No. 1). 
21. The army regulations make it clear that a personal representative must serve 
voluntarily. The army will not order or appoint someone to fill that role. Army Reg. 
No. 27-10, ,r 3-14b (Change 12, Dec. 1973). The navy also places the responsibility 
of obtaining a personal representative on the accused. Judge Advocate General Manual, 
supra note 18 (Advance Change No. 4). 
These regulations arguably result in a denial of equal protection to service mem-
bers who are financially unable to retain a lawyer. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). (The equal protection principles 
of the fourteenth amendment are included in the fifth amendment guarantee of 
due process, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and therefore apply to the 
military.) The Court in Griffin held that a defendant could not be denied appellate 
review merely because he could not afford. to purchase the stenographic transcript 
or report of the trial proceedings. The Court reasoned that although there was no 
constitutional right to appellate review, the state could not provide it and at the 
same time establish conditions "that discriminat[e] against some convicted defendants 
on account of their poverty." 351 U.S. at 18. In Douglas the Court invalidated Cali-
fornia's requirement that an indigent defendant make a preliminary showing of the 
merits of his case before counsel is appointed to represent him on appeal. A showing 
of merit did not have to be made by a criminal defendant who was financially capable 
of retaining counsel. The Court thus held that the practice was contrary to the 
equal protection principles announced in Griffin. A broad interpretation of Griffin 
and Douglas would award a right to assigned counsel to indigent persons whenever 
a wealthy person is allowed to be represented by retained counsel. Appointed counsel 
would be required in all article 15 proceedings under this analysis. 
The Supreme Court does not appear to be willing to extend Griffin and Douglas, 
however. Subsequent decisions have relied entirely upon a sixth amendment or a due 
process analysis in holding that a defendant is entitled to appointed counsel. See, 
e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). Furthermore, a due process element has been imputed to the Griffin-Douglas 
principle itself in subsequent decisions. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 
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Punishments allowed under article 15 range from a reprimand 
to thirty days of correctional custody.22 A service member may also 
(1971); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Warden, 
85 Nev. 83, 450 P.2d 356, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969); Riggins v. Rhar, 7u 
Wash. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969). The use of due process or sixth amendment 
analysis rather than equal protection analysis indicates that indigents do not 
necessarily have a right to counsel in all situations in which counsel may be retained, 
Appointment of counsel must be necessary to protect the rights of the indigent to 
a fair trial in a criminal proceeding. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 2u (1972); 
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
22. IO U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970): 
Subject to subsection (a) of this section, any commanding officer may, in addition 
to or in lieu of admonition or reprimand, impose one or more of the following 
disci_plinary punishments for minor offenses without the intervention of a court• 
martial-
(1) upon officers of his command-
(A) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from 
duty, for not more than 30 consecutive days; 
(B) if imposed by an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction or 
an officer of general or flag rank in command-
(i) arrest in quarters for no more than 30 consecutive days; 
(ii) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month 
for two months; 
(iii) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension 
from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days; 
(iv) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month 
for three months; 
(2) upon other personnel of his command-
(A) if imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a vessel, confine-
ment on bread and water or diminished rations for not more than three con-
secutive days; 
(B) correctional custody for not more than seven consecutive days; 
(C) forfeiture of not more than seven days' pay; 
(D) reduction to the next inferior pay grade, if the grade from which 
demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the reduction 
or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction; 
(E) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 14 
consecutive days; 
(F) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from 
duty, for not more than 14 consecutive days; 
(G) detention of not more than 14- days' pay; 
(H) if imposed by an officer of the grade of major or lieutenant com• 
mander, or above--
(i) the punishment authorized under subsection (b)(2)(A); 
(ii) correctional custody for not more than 30 consecutive days; 
(iii) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month 
for two months; 
(iv) reduction to the lowest or any intermediate pay grade, if the grade 
from which demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer impos-
ing the reduction or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the 
reduction, but an enlisted member in a pay grade above E-4 may not be 
reduced more than two pay grades; 
(v) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 
45 consecutive days; 
(vi) restrictions to certain specified limits, with or without suspension 
from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days; 
(vii) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month 
for three months. 
Detention of pay shall be for a stated period of not more than one year but if 
the offender's term of service expires earlier, the detention shall termmatc upon 
that expiration. No two or more of the punishments of arrest in quarters, con• 
finement on bread and water or diminished rations, correctional custody, extra 
duties, and restriction may be combined to run consecutively in the maximum 
amount imposable for each. Whenever any of those punishments arc combined 
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suffer a reduction in rank or the levy of a fine.23 Lesser penalties in-
clude extra duties for up to forty-five days and restriction to certain 
areas for up to sixty days.24 A notation of the punishment may be in-
cluded in the service member's record25 and may be introduced at a 
subsequent court-martial for the purpose of sentencing.26 The ser-
vice member can appeal the punishment to the next highest com-
manding officer27 or seek collateral review in the federal courts.28 
The right of an accused to be provided counsel in an article 15 
proceeding depends in the first instance on the applicability of the 
Bill of Rights to military personnel.29 This issue was first raised in 
Dynes v. Hoover,80 in which a seaman found guilty of attempted de-
sertion sought to set aside his conviction and sentence in the federal 
to run consecutively, there must be an apportionment. In addition, forfeiture 
of pay may not be combined with detention of pay without an apportionment. 
For the purposes of this subsection, "correctional custody" is the physical restraint 
of a person during duty or nonduty hours and may include extra duties, fatigue 
duties, or hard labor. If practicable, correctional custody will not be served in 
immediate association with persons awaiting trial or held in confinement pursuant 
to trial by court-martial. 
See also MCM, supra note 1, ,i 131b. 
23. See note 22 supra. 
24. See note 22 supra. 
25. The Manual for Courts-Martial defines personnel records of the accused to 
include "all those records made or maintained in accordance with departmental regu-
lations which reflect the past conduct and performance of the accused." MCM, supra 
note 1, ~ 75d. Army regulations provide that records of punishment under article 15 
will be maintained in the service member's personnel file. Army Reg. 27-10, ~~ 3-
15b(l), (2), (3) (Change 12, Dec. 1973). Records of article 15 punishments of enlisted 
persons serving on active duty in the army for three years or less are withdrawn 
from the service member's Military Personnel Records Jacket when: "(I) The indi-
vidual is separated from the Army; (2) All punishments are set aside; (3) Two years 
have expired since imposition of the punishment." Army Reg. 27-10, ~ 3-15b(3)(b) 
(Change 12, Dec. 1973). (This is not true for army officers or enlisted personnel who 
have completed more than three years of service. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i,i 3-15b(l)-(2) 
(Change 12, Dec. 1973).) A permanent record of all article 15 punishments remains 
in every service member's Official Military Personnel File. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-15b 
(l)(a), (2)(a), (3)(a). 
26. MCM, supra note 1, ,i 75d; see United States v. Johnson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 
467, 42 C.M.R. 66, 69 (1970). 
27. 10 U.S.C, § 815(e) (1970); MCM, supra note I, ,i 135. Only the service member's 
punishment, and not his guilt, may be appealed. 
28. Military court decisions cannot be appealed directly to federal courts. They 
may be collaterally attacked, however, in actions seeking habeas corpus relief, back 
pay, mandamus, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or tort damages. The scope of 
review in the federal courts does not vary with the form of relief sought; the 
applicable criteria are set forth in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See also 
Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 
2045); H. MOYER, JUSTICE IN THE MILITARY 1158-82 (1972). 
29. See J. BISHOP, JusrrCE UNDER FmE 113-73 (1974); Henderson, Courts-Martial 
and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957); 
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 181 (1962); Wiener, 
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1 
(1958). 
30. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). 
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courts. The Supreme Court held that "[w]ith the sentences of courts 
martial which have been convened regularly, and have proceeded 
legally, and by which punishments are directed, not forbidden by 
law, or which are according to the laws and customs of the sea, civil 
courts have nothing to do, nor are they in any way alterable by 
them."31 
Some authorities have argued that, since the Court in Dynes was 
unwilling to consider constitutional issues on review of military de-
cisions, the decision implied that the Bill of Rights did not apply to 
the military.32 This is not the only possible interpretation, however. 
The limited scope of review announced by Dynes may simply defer 
to the military the balancing of individual constitutional rights and 
military necessity.33 The Bill of Rights is thus not entirely inappli-
cable under Dynes; its scope, however, is not to be decided by the 
courts but by the military, which has a better understanding of its 
particular needs.34 
The proper interpretation of Dynes should have been settled 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Burns v. Wilson,35 involving the 
31. 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 82. 
32. See 6 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 4 (1937); 5 C.J.S. Army and Navy § 9 (1916); 
21 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 492 (1953). See also In re Bogart, 3 F. Cas. '796 (No. 1596) 
(C.C. Cal. 1873). 
33. For an example of the Supreme Court's recognition of and deferral to military 
expertise, see Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 178 (1885), where the Court noted: 
"Of questions, not depending upon the construction of the statutes, but upon un-
written military law or usage within the jurisdiction of courts-martial, military or 
naval officers, from their training and experience in the service, are more competent 
judges than the courts of common law." 
34. One commentator bas urged that Dynes implied that the Congress and tl1e 
President have the sole power to determine the extent to which the Bill of Rights may 
be qualified to accommodate the unique needs of the military. See Note, Constitutional 
Rights of Seruicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 127, 130 (1964). The 
argument is based on the idea that to leave the determination of the applicability of 
the Bill of Rights to the military is in fact to leave the determination to the legislative 
and the executive branches, under whose control the military operates by virtue of 
article I, section 8, and article ll, section 2, of the Constitution. 
Although courts have intervened in determining the applicability of the Bill of 
Rights to the military to a far greater extent than was apparently envisioned by Dynes, 
see text accompanying notes 35-39 infra, Congress has in fact taken the lead in allowing 
service members to exercise constitutional rights by enacting and amending the UCMJ. 
Before the enactment of the UCMJ, military authorities often took disciplinary action 
witltout regard for a service member's rights. Courts-martial commonly imposed 
exorbitant punishments without providing the accused with procedural protections. 
See Sherman, The Civilization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L R.Ev. 3 (1970). The UCMJ 
ended the system of "drumhead justice," id. at 4, by providing accused service members 
with many of the rights enjoyed by civilian defendants. See J. BISHOP, supra note 29, at 
137; W. GENEROUS, SwoIU>s AND SCALES 34-53 (1973). A stated objective of the UCMJ 
was to achieve a fairer balance between the military's need for discipline and the 
service member's constitutional rights. See Hearings on R.R. 2198 Before a Subcomm. 
of the House Comm. on Armed Seruices, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 606 (1949) [hereinafter 
House Hearings] (testimony of Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr., chairman of the 
committee that drafted the UCMJ). 
35. 346 U.S. 137 (1953). 
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jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to pe-
titioners convicted of rape and murder by air force courts-martial. 
The Court acknowledged that "the rights of men in the armed forces 
must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands 
of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which 
must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjust-
ment."36 The judicial nonintervention contemplated by Dynes, how-
ever, was rejected; the Court held that federal courts could decide 
whether the petitioner's allegations of deprivation of constitutional 
rights were dealt with "fully and fairly" by the military courts.37 The 
expansion of the scope of review was an implicit recognition that 
service members are protected to some extent by the Bill of Rights,38 
and a majority of cases have so held.39 
It is clear, however, that service members are not protected by 
the Bill of Rights to the same extent as civilians. Certain individual 
rights must give way to military necessity. The Constitution, for in-
36. 346 U.S. at 140 (footnote omitted). 
37. 346 U.S. at 142. The "fully and fairly'' test has been differently interpreted by 
lower federal courts. At one extreme are cases that grant review of a constitutional 
issue only if the military court did not consider the issue at all. E.g., Suttles v. Davis, 
215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir.), cert .. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 
(10th Cir. 1953). At the other extreme are cases that hold that civilian courts may 
review any constitutional errors of military courts on the ground that a trial is not 
"fair" if a service member is denied a constitutional right. E.g., Kauffman v. Secretary 
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969); Sweet v. · 
Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959). 
Burns is consistent with other decisions holding that the judicial branch may 
review the constitutionality of actions that lie within the sole power of the executive 
or legislative branches. See United States v. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 24, 1974); 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
38. Although the Supreme Court recently limited the application of the first 
amendment to the military setting, Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 42 U.S.L.W. 5233 
(U.S. July 8, 1974); Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974), it explicitly 
held that the service member was "not excluded from the protection granted by the 
First Amendment." Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979, 4987 (U.S. June 19, 1974). 
The constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court are now considered binding 
on military courts unless military necessity dictates otherwise. See Kauffman v. Secretary 
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969) ("We 
hold that the test of fairness requires that military ,rulings on constitutional issues 
conform to Supreme Court standards, unless it is shown that conditions peculiar to 
military life require a different rule.''); United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 
46 C.M.R. 298 (1973); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 
(1967); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960). In Tempia 
the Court of Military Appeals was most explicit, stating: "The impact of Burns ••• is 
of an unequivocal holding by the Supreme Court that the protections of the Con-
stitution are available to servicemen in military trials.'' 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 634, 37 
C.M.R. at 254. See also Warren, supra note 29, at 188-89. 
39. E.g., Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 
U.S.L.W. 2045); Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). 
But see, e.g., Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 
483 (10th Cir. 1953). 
1440 Michigan Law Review [Vo], 72:1431 
stance, provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces."40 
The Supreme Court has reiterated in other contexts the view 
that individual guarantees must often yield to the military's need for 
absolute discipline.41 In O'Callahan v. Parker,42 for instance, the 
Court in dictum stated: "That a system of specialized military courts, 
proceeding by practices different from those obtaining in the regu-
lar courts and in general less favorable to defendants, is necessary to 
an effective national defense establishment, few would deny."43 Most 
recently the Court held that the constitutional prohibitions against 
vague laws and against inhibition of free speech cannot be applied 
to the military ·with the same force that they possess in civilian so-
ciety. 44 The Court stated bluntly: "The fundamental necessity for 
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, 
may render permissible within the military that which would be con-
stitutionally impermissible outside it."46 
The protection the service member receives from the Bill of 
Rights thus depends on a balancing of the individual's constitutional 
40. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added). 
41. Referring to article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution, which grants 
to Congress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces," the Court in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956), stated: "It has 
been held that this creates an exception to the normal method of trial in civilian 
courts as provided by the Constitution and permits Congress to authorize military trial 
of members of the armed services without all the safeguards given an accused by 
Article III of the Bill of Rights." 354 U.S. at 19. Later the Court summarized: 
"It still remains true that military tribunals have not been and probably never 
can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications 
that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal 
courts." In part this is attributable to the inherent differences in values and atti• 
tudes that separate the military establishment from civilian society. In the military, 
by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security and order of the group rather 
than on the value and integrity of the individual. 
354 U.S. at 39, quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
In Ex parte Milligan, '71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Court stated, after discussing 
the exception for grand jury indictment in the fifth amendment (see text accompanying 
note 40 supra): 
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required other 
and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts; and, 
in pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared 
the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for offenses 
committed while the party is in the military or naval service. Every one connected 
with these branches of the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which 
Congress has created for their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his 
right to be tried by the civil courts. 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 123. 
42. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
43. 395 U.S. at 265. 
44. Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974). 
45. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987. 
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rights against the demands of military necessity.46 The balancing ap-
proach as taken by federal courts is illustrated in Henry v. Warner,47 
which held that defendants have a right to counsel in summary 
courts-martial. The court noted that "the special attributes of mili-
tary justice ... 'cannot justify denial of basic constitutional rights 
when both these rights and the needs of the military can be success-
fully accommodated.' "4!3 Similarly, the court in Application of 
Stapley, which held that a service member has the right to adequate 
counsel at a special court-martial, stated that "the assignment of de-
fense counsel possessing at least minimal qualifications to rationally 
advise on substantive and procedural legal problems may not be 
deemed precluded in this day and age in the absence of a showing of 
overriding military necessity that does not exist here.''49 
Military courts, as well as federal courts, have faced the problem 
of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the military setting. Al-
though one might have expected the military courts to have limited 
constitutional rights more than federal courts, they have consistently 
held, relying on Burns, that the military must accord the service 
member "all the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which 
are expressly or by implication inapplicable.''50 
The "express" limitation refers to the exemption of the military 
from the fifth amendment requirement that a defendant accused of 
a capital or "infamous" crime be held only upon presentment or in-
dictment by a grand jury.51 What is meant by a protection "by im-
plication inapplicable" is less clear, however. One judge states that 
the phrase covers only the right to a jury trial-that is, since the sixth 
amendment requires a jury trial only where a presentment or indict-
ment is necessary, and since no presentment or indictment is needed 
for military defendants, the right to a jury trial is inapplicable.52 
46. E.g., Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974); Betonie v. Sizemore, 
No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 2045), slip op. at 5413 
(dictum); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). 
47. 357 F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. 
July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 2045), and United States v. Alderman, 22 
U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973), also held that defendants have a right to counsel 
in summary courts-martial. 
48. 357 F. Supp. at 495, quoting Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (D. 
Hawaii 1972). 
49. 246 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Utah 1965) (emphasis added). 
50. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 247 (1960); 
accord, United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 634, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967). 
51. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
52. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution protect certain funda-
mental rights and privileges of persons accused of crime. With only a single express 
exception, there is no withholding of the protection of these rights and privileges 
from an accused because he is, at the time, serving with the armed forces of his 
country. Under the express exception, set out in the Fifth Amendment, an 
accused in the armed forces may be held to answer for a capital, or othenvise 
infamous crime, without presentment or indictment of a grand jury. • •• To this 
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Other rights apply to the military as fully as they apply to civilians. 
This was apparently the view taken in United States v. Tempia,03 in 
which the Court of Military Appeals reversed the conviction of an 
airman who was not given the aid of appointed counsel during cus-
todial interrogation.04 In a nonmilitary case, Miranda v. Arizona,c;r, 
the Supreme Court had ruled that appointed counsel was necessary 
adequately to protect the accused's fifth amendment right against 
self-incrimination. The Judge Advocate General of the navy argued 
that Miranda's stringent formula was undesirable in the military 
context and that the military courts need not follow it. The Court 
of Military Appeals flatly rejected this attempt to make an exemp-
tion for the military and held that "the views of 'the Supreme Court 
of the United States on constitutional issues' are binding on us."00 
In the later case of United States v. Alderma,n,01 however, Judges 
Darden and Duncan apparently agreed that the constitutional pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court were subject to re-evaluation by 
the military courts in the light of military necessity. Alderman dealt 
with the right of an indigent service member to appointed counsel 
at a summary court-martial. Judge Darden remarked in dissent that 
Court of Military Appeals "decisions have not applied specific pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights to military law without regard for their 
effect on the mission of the armed forces and the basic reason for 
their existence. Rather, we have recognized the need for balancing 
the application of the constitutional protection against military 
needs."58 He concluded that unless the Supreme Court directly held 
express exception may be added the implied limitation of the right of trial by 
jury, as protected by the Sixth Amendment, to the extent that a jury trial is re-
quired only where presentment or indictment is necessary. • • • No other recog-
nized exceptions have been cited and I know of none. The opinions of the 
appellate courts in the Bums case, supra, support the conclusion that there arc 
no other exceptions. 
United States v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 228, 11 C.M.R, 220, 228 (1953) (Quinn, J., 
dissenting). 
53. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). 
54. The accused was informed that he would be permitted to "retain civilian counsel 
at his own expense, who could appear at his interrogation," but that "no attorney 
would be appointed to represent him in any law enforcement investigation," 16 
U.S.C.M.A. at 637, 37 C.M.R. at 256-57. The Manual for Courts-Martial has been 
amended to incorporate the Tempia decision into the prescribed interrogation pro• 
cedures. MCM, supra note 1, ,I 140a{2). 
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
56. 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 635, 37 C.M.R. at 255, quoting United States v. Armbruster, 
11 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412,414 (1960). 
57. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). The defendant appealed his conviction 
by a special court-martial on the ground that evidence of his previous conviction by a 
summary court-martial should not have been admitted. He argued that since the sixth 
amendment as interpreted by Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), required that 
counsel be provided at a summary court-martial and counsel had not been so provided, 
the conviction by the summary court-martial was invalid. 
58. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 30~, 46 C.M.R. at 307, 
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that the right to counsel applied to summary courts-martial, the mili-
tary courts should defer to the congressional decision not to extend 
the right to the military setting.59 Judge Duncan apparently agreed 
with Judge Darden's assertion that "Congressional enactments de-
serve deference in determining the balance that must be struck be-
tween the protection of an accused's constitutional rights and the 
needs of military discipline,"60 admitting that military necessity may 
require an exception to a constitutional right.61 However, he did 
not find that the record contained any evidence that would warrant 
a limitation on the right to counsel in the military setting.62 
The view that military necessity may abrogate constitutional 
rights appears to have been accepted by the Supreme Court in the 
recent case of Parker v. Levy.63 At issue were articles 133 and 134 of 
the UCMJ, establishing the power of a court-martial to impose pun-
ishment for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," "all 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good in the armed forces," 
and "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed 
forces."64 
Levy, an army captain, argued that both articles were void for 
vagueness under the due process clause of the fifth amendment and 
that they were overbroad in their curtailment of free speech. Justice 
Rehnquist, ·writing for the Court, admitted that "members of the 
military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First _ 
Amendment."65 However, the "fundamental necessity for obedience, 
and the consequent necessity for the imposition of discipline,''66 out-
weighed Levy's right to express his views to enlisted personnel and 
to be informed as to precisely what conduct would be considered a 
criminal violation. 67 
Even ignoring the view that the Bill of Rights applies with full 
force to the military with the exception of the presentment and in-
59. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 309, 46 C.M.R. at 309. 
60. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 306-07, 46 C.M.R. at 306-07. 
61. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303. 
62. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303. 
63. 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 19, 1974). 
64. "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct." 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970). "Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good in the armed forces, all conduct of a 
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, 
of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of 
by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree 
of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court." 10 U.S.C. § 934 
(1970). 
65. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987. 
66. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987. 
67. This holding was followed in the similar case of Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 
42 U.S.L.W. 5233 (U.S. July 8, 1974). 
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dictment requirement of the fifth amendment and the right to jury 
trial of the sixth amendment, 68 and accepting the view that a "fun-
damental" military necessity may limit a service member's rights, 
courts should find a right to counsel in article 15 proceedings. As the 
following discussion makes clear, no substantial military need justi-
fies withholding that right. 
One of the tw'O basic aspects of military necessity that might war-
rant infringement upon the rights of an individual is discipline. Dis-
cipline is essential to an effective fighting force because a commander 
must be able to rely on obedience to orders by military personnel 
even in the face of grave danger.69 The provision of counsel at arti-
cle 15 proceedings, it might be argued, would hinder the mainte-
nance of discipline first because it would weaken the role of the com-
manding officer as the ultimate arbiter of the service member's guilt. 
While the commander would still decide guilt or innocence and im-
pose sentence, counsel would provide the service member with a 
spokesman for his cause, who would dispute the allegations posed by 
the commander and argue that he would be ·wrong to impose punish-
ment. The accused would identify with his counsel and not with his 
superior. He will no longer perceive the commander's judgment as 
beyond scrutiny. 
Second, provision of counsel would arguably slow the presently 
swift proceedings under article 15. Robinson 0. Everett, a noted ex-
pert on military law, has written: "Even in civilian life it is said that 
'Justice delayed is justice defeated.' This statement is still truer in 
military life, where, to maintain discipline, the unpleasant conse-
quences of offenses must be quick, certain, and vivid-not something 
vague in the remote future."70 
These arguments are strengthened by the opinion of the Supreme 
Court in Parker, which stressed the need for obedience and disci-
pline as a justification for narrowing first amendment rights of ser-
vice members.71 The Court noted that" '[t]he armed forces depend 
on a command structure that at times must commit men to combat, 
not only hazarding their lives but ultimately involving the security 
68. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. 
69. Frederick Bemams Wiener testified at the 1949 congressional hearings on the 
UCMJ that "we are up against the stubborn hard fact that the purpose of an armed 
force is to send men obediently to their death, and that it is very carefully designed 
just for that purpose." House Hearings, supra note 34-, at 780. Wiener is a noted mili-
tary writer, and at the time of the hearings he was a colonel and the commanding 
officer of a Judge Advocate General service training center in the army reserves. See 
also Wood, Discipline and Military Justice, 21 JUDGE .ADVOCATE J. 1 (1955), for a 
thorough explanation of the need for teamwork and discipline in the military. 
70. R. EVERE'IT, Mn.rrARY JusnCE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 4 
(1956). 
71. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra. 
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of the nation itself. Speech that is protected in the civil population 
may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness of response to com-
mand.' "72 
The discipline rationale, whatever its strengths in other settings, 
cannot justify the failure to appoint counsel in article 15 cases. Pro-
viding counsel obviously would not undermine discipline to the 
same extent as allowing a commissioned officer to urge publicly that 
enlisted men refuse to obey orders that might send them into com-
bat-the root of the controversy in Parker. Simply put, the obedience 
to orders by combatants is the essence of military necessity; speech 
encouraging disobedience is justifiably restricted.73 The advantage 
in maintaining discipline by not allowing counsel in article 15 pro-
ceedings is tenuous at best-in no sense is it directly related to the 
swift obedience of combat orders. 
Furthermore, considerations based on the psychology of military 
service indicate that the military can better meet its need for disci-
pline by providing counsel in an article 15 proceeding than by deny-
ing it. Experts maintain that punishment can instill obedience and 
loyalty only if it is perceived as just and is associated with the in-
dividual's commanding officer. Richard H. Wels, testifying before 
the House subcommittee that considered enactment of the UCMJ, 
stated: "We believe that discipline is dependent in a large degree 
upon the morale of the men who make up the services, and we do 
not believe that there can be good morale when men feel that the 
service courts which are set up to do them justice are not real and 
72. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4987, quoting United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 
C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972). 
73. A strong argument can be made that Parker v. Levy should be limited to 
combat personnel, for whom the need for discipline becomes paramount. In this respect 
it is interesting to note that increasing emphasis on service members' constitutional 
rights has developed with, and perhaps is attributable to, the growth of the mili-
tary from a small group of fighting men to a huge organization whose members 
often have little to do with combat. After Washington's first inauguration there were 
only 672 men in the army. Several million serve in the armed forces today. Warren, 
supra note 29, at 187. Former Chief Justice Earl Warren, commenting on the increase 
in size of the army, stated: ''When the authority of the military has such a sweeping 
capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military 
establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the civilian courts almost inevitably 
is drawn into question." Warren, supra, at 188. 
Furthermore, technological developments have reduced the need for combat skills 
and increased the need for technical specialties. Thus, today only about 14 per cent of 
military personnel have job classifications that require combat skills, while 54 per cent 
have special technical skills. Hearings on Nation's Manpower Revolution Before the 
.Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt, 8, at 2579 (1963). It is difficult to justify the subordi-
nation of the constitutional rights of all service members when only a small percentage 
will be required to enter combat and obey orders that place their lives in danger. 
However, it may be argued that the unflagging obedience of all service members is 
necessary for optimum combat performance, and that drawing lines will be adminis-
tratively inconvenient and detrimental to morale in the services. 
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fair courts as we think of them here in America."74 Similarly, as 
Robert D. L'Heureux testified before the same subcommittee: "If 
your code of military justice is unjust, you will not have discipline, 
you ·will invite bitter resentment with which esprit de corps is im-
possible, you will incite characters who would never have become 
criminals in civilian life to become felons in the service."70 A former 
Undersecretary of the Navy emphasized the importance of the sol-
dier's attitude toward his commander: "The existence of discipline 
depends in large measure upon the amount of respect which the per-
sonnel of the unit have for the commanding officer-respect for his 
ability, his fairness, and his authority."76 
Although article 15 punishment is swift and associated with the 
commanding officer, the proceeding often lacks the appearance of 
justice. The absolute discretion of the commander and the secrecy 
of the article 15 proceeding can create feelings of unequal treatment 
among service members who are charged with the same offense. Mem-
bers of racial minorities often feel that they are punished for inci-
dents that would be ignored if committed by a white service mem-
ber. 77 The presence of counsel could serve as an informal review of 
the commanding officer's action and thus minimize the potential for 
arbitrary or prejudicial decisions. Moreover, provision of counsel 
would give service members a full opportunity to articulate a defense 
and would reduce the· skepticism that is inevitably fostered when in-
dividuals believe that they have been deprived of their constitutional 
rights and treated unfairly. After the accused has had the opportunity 
to present his views openly, the commander would still determine 
guilt and levy punishment; consequently, punishment would remain 
associated with the commander and would continue to reinforce his 
authority. Although the presence of counsel may slow the swiftness 
of the proceeding, a limit on the time by which counsel must be pre-
pared could reduce delay. Also, the delay cost may be insignificant. 
Counsel is already provided to assist the accused in choosing between 
an article 15 proceeding or a court-martial;78 the lawyer would thus 
need little additional time to become familiar with the case. 
74. House Hearings, supra note 84, at 641 (testimony of Richard H. Weis, Chairman, 
Special Committee of Military Justice of the New York County Lawyers' Association). 
75. Id. at 816 (testimony of Robert D. L'Heureux, Chief Counsel, Senate Ilanking 
and Currency Committee). 
76. Id. at 1122 (testimony of W. John Kenney, Undersecretary of the Navy). 
77. "The Task Force has noted that nonjudicial punishment, largely because of 
the wide degree of discretion possessed by the commander in this area, is the subject 
of much criticism. Many blacks, for example, feel-and the Task Force statistics con-
firm-that nonjudicial punishment impacts on them more often, proportionately, than 
on whites and that they receive nonjudicial punishment for incidents for which whites 
would receive nothing." 2 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILi• 
TARY JUSIICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 87 (1972). 
78. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
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It should also be emphasized that the armed services have means 
to achieve discipline that do not deny a service member the proce-
dural protections of the Constitution. Military offenses are created 
to punish conduct that would not be a civilian crime,79 such as failure 
to salute and other forms of disrespect toward superiors.80 
A second facet of military necessity that may justify infringement 
of individuals' rights concerns the logistical requirements of the mili-
tary. Technological advances in communications, air and land trans-
port, and general warfare techniques have reduced the need to send 
small groups of personnel into positions that do not allow a periodic 
return to headquarters. However, some troops may still be placed in 
strategic positions that severely limit communication and transpor-
tation, especially during wartime. Small groups of special forces per-
sonnel may be isolated in enemy territory, for example, and sailors 
may be forced to occupy small vessels for long periods. 
If a commanding officer invokes article 15 in such a situation, mili-
tary necessity may require an exception to the service member's right 
to counsel. The right, however, should be denied only when provi-
sion of counsel is in fact impossible. 81 Commissioned officers should 
79. [Military] offenses are acts that would be rights in the civilian society. Take 
the business of telling off the boss, that is an inalienable right of an American 
citizen. If you tell off the sergeant or a commissioned officer, that is a military 
offense. In the civilian life, if you do not like your job, you quit it. If you do not 
like your job in the Army and quit, that is called desertion in wartime and it 
carries very serious consequences. In civilian life, if people decide they do not like 
working conditions and walk off jointly, that is a strike. In the Army or in the 
Navy, that kind of an action is mutiny, which is one of the most serious offenses. 
House Hearings, supra note 34, at 779 (testimony of Frederick :Bernams Wiener). 
80. 10 u.s.c. §§ 889, 891 (1970). ! 
The distinction benveen infringing on the procedural rights of the accused at a 
criminal proceeding and defining a crime to include a broader range of conduct than is 
proscribed by civilian codes may further distinguish Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979 
(U.S. June 19, 1974) (see text accompanying notes 63-67 supra), from the article 15 case. 
Arguably Parker did not demand an "overriding" military necessity for infringing on 
the defendant's first amendment rights. It cited only a general need for discipline and 
the great difference benveen and separation of the military and civilian systems of 
justice. The military's need for obedience may justify limiting the service member's 
conduct by creating offenses that would be vague or overbroad in the civilian context; 
however, once a violation is alleged to have occurred, courts should demand that the 
military show an overriding need before the service member's right to a fair hearing 
concerning his guilt is abridged. This reading of Parker is supported in the following 
passage from the opinion: 
[The] Code cannot be equated to a civilian criminal code. It, and the various 
versions of the Articles of War which have preceded it, regulate aspects of the 
conduct of members of the military which in the civilian sphere are left unregu-
lated. While a civilian criminal code carves out a relatively small segment of 
potential conduct and declares it criminal, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
essays more varied regulation of a much larger segment of the activities of the more 
tightly knit military community. In civilian life there is no legal sanction-civil or 
criminal-for failure to behave as an officer and a gentleman; in the military 
world, Art. 133 imposes such a sanction on a commissioned officer. The Code 
likewise imposes other sanctions for conduct that in civilian life is not subject to 
criminal penalties •••• 
42 U.S.LW. at 4984. 
81. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(l) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,i 6c, which create a similar 
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be assigned to act as defense counsel for the accused if no Ia-wyer is 
available, as is the practice in a special court-martial.B2 Perhaps the 
proceeding can be delayed until counsel is available. In order to en-
sure that the military necessity justification is not abused the com-
manding officer should be required to make a detailed written ex-
planation of why counsel could not be obtained.Ba 
Except in the extreme situations discussed above, there is no 
"fundamental"B4 military necessity that vitiates the application of 
the sixth amendment to the military. Whether the accused in an 
article 15 proceeding has the right to appointed counsel thus depends 
on the substantive requirements for the application of the sixth 
amendment as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the civilian 
context. 
The first requirement is that the defendant seeking counsel be 
under threat of criminal prosecution.BG The Supreme Court has 
exception for special courts-martial. Qualified legal counsel must be provided unless 
they "cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies." 
Use of this exception is carefully scrutinized; if qualified counsel is not obtained, "the 
convening authority shall make a detailed written statement to be appended to the 
record, stating why counsel ••• could not be obtained." IO U.S.C. § 827(c)(l) (1970), Sec 
also MCM, supra, 11 6c. 
82. MCM, supra note I, 1J 6c. 
83. See note 81 supra. 
84. See text accompanying note 66 supra. 
85. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
There is a possibility that an accused has a right to counsel that does not require 
that he be subject to a criminal prosecution, derived under the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment rather than under the sixth amendment. In In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the right to counsel was spoken of as a necessary require-
ment of a fair hearing, 387 U.S. at 38-41, suggesting that the right has an independent 
basis in the due process clause, apart from the characterization of a juvenile pro-
ceeding as "criminal." But see 387 U.S. at 59-60 (Black, J., concurring). This reading 
of Gault is supported in the later case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 
(1971), in which the Court asserted that the juvenile court proceeding has not yet 
been held to be a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the sixth amendment 
and thus implicitly characterized Gault as relying on the due process standard of 
"fundamental fairness" for the right to counsel. 403 U.S. at 543. A due process right to 
counsel was also found in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which the Supreme 
Court held that before a state can lawfully cut off welfare benefits it must afford the 
recipient a hearing at which he may be represented by counsel. 397 U.S. at 261, 270, 
See also Heryford v. Parker, 396 F,2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 
446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968); In re Fisher, excerpted in 43 U.S.L.W. 2050 
(Ohio Sup. Ct. July IO, 1974); Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional 
Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH, L. REv. 
717, 742-52 (1974). 
The existence of a right to counsel under the due process clause in the article 15 
context would depend upon a balancing of the individual's interest in being repre-
sented by counsel and the military's interest in proceeding without the intervention 
of counsel. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-65 (1970); Grano, supra, at 744, It 
should be pointed out that the balancing required under the due process clause would 
be much more flexible and unpredictable than the balancing required to determine 
if the sixth amendment applies to the military (see text accompanying notes 29-83 
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employed two tests to determine whether a particular proceeding is 
a criminal prosecution. The first test, which assesses whether the 
proceeding at issue results in a punitive sanction, was applied in 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.so The Court there found an expatria-
tion proceeding conducted by the Immigration Service against indi-
viduals who left the United States to evade military service to be a 
criminal prosecution. Although the Court listed a number of criteria 
to use in determining the purpose of the sanction,s1 it ultimately 
relied on legislative history to show that the imposition of expatria-
tion was intended to be a punishment.ss 
The second test balances the governmental interests in conduct-
ing the proceeding without certain procedural safeguards against 
the detriment to the individual who is the subject of the proceed-
ing.so The Court ·will consider the proceeding criminal if the indi-
vidual's interests outweigh the governmental interests. The particular 
right under consideration will influence the outcome; a court may 
hold that a proceeding is criminal when considering some proce-
dural safeguards but not when considering others.90 
supra). The latter inquiry, which should perhaps not be termed a "balancing" at all, 
determines only if there is a specific fundamental military need that vitiates an indi-
vidual's constitutional right. The due process inquiry, on the other hand, would 
consider matters such as cost and administrative feasibility to determine whether a right 
exists. It is also not clear what balance yields a right to appointed counsel, as dis-
tinguished from the right to be represented by retained counsel. Full discussion of a 
potential right to counsel under the due process clause is beyond the scope of this 
Note. See also text accompanying notes 98-103 infra. 
86. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
87. The criteria the Court listed were: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it 
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only 
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims 
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it 
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned •••• 
372 U.S. at 168-69. 
88. 372 U.S. at 169-70. 
89. See Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disci-
plinary Proceedings, 72 MICH, L REv. 84, 90 (1973). 
90. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court held that a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding was criminal for the purpose of allowing the exercise of the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. Although the governmental interest in discarding 
the rigidities and technicalities of the criminal law so as better to treat and rehabilitate 
the juvenile was recognized, 387 U.S. at 15-16, the Court felt that it was outweighed by 
the interest of the juvenile in invoking the fifth amendment. Several years later, in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court again used the balancing ap-
proach and again decided to treat a juvenile delinquency proceeding as a criminal 
trial. 397 U.S. at 361-64. The procedural safeguard at issue in Winship was the rule 
placing the burden of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the government. 
After emphasizing the importance of the rule historically and in modem practice, the 
Court compared the protections it afforded the individual with the governmental 
interest in maintaining flexibility in juvenile proceedings. 397 U.S. at 365·68, It did not 
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Evaluating article 15 proceedings under both of these tests is not 
necessary. The balancing test, it is submitted, is not needed if the 
purpose of the sanction is clearly punitive; a court should use it only 
when the purpose of the sanction is not clear. Thus, the Court in 
Kennedy relied on legislative history that definitively indicated that 
expatriation was meant to be a punishment.91 By comparison, the 
proceedings at issue in cases using the balancing test were arguably 
nonadversary inquiries with nonpunitive purposes.92 
There is strong evidence that the purpose of an article 15 pro-
ceeding is to impose punishment. One indication is the title of article 
15-"commanding officer's nonjudicial punishment."93 Another is 
the legislative history of the article, which indicates that one of its 
purposes was to enable commanding officers to impose "increased 
punishments substantially the same as those now within the punitive 
authority of a summary court-martial."94 In addition, military courts 
view an article 15 proceeding as an alternative to court-martial, and 
thus punitive in nature.05 In light of this evidence, a court should 
consider an article 15 proceeding to be a criminal prosecution under 
the Kennedy test. 
The holding of the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin°0 
may present a second requirement for the application of the sixth 
amendment in article 15 proceedings. The Court there held that the 
labeling of a crime as a misdemeanor or a felony has no significance 
for the defendant's right to counsel; instead, counsel must be pro-
vided in any case where the sentence "actually leads to imprisonment 
even for a brief period."97 
The effect of the Argersinger holding on the article 15 right to 
perceive "any merit in the argument that to afford juveniles the protection of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile 
process." 397 U.S. at 366. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court, 
employing the balancing test, found that juvenile proceedings were not criminal for 
the purpose of requiring trial by jury. 
91. 372 U.S. at 167. 
92. See note 85 supra. 
93. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970) (emphasis added). 
94. Hearings on H.R. 11257 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed 
Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962) (testimony of Major General Albert M, Kuhfeld, 
Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force) [hereinafter Kuhfeld Testi-
mony]. 
95. The Court of Military Review stated in United States v. Delancy, 44 C.M.R. 
367, 368 (1971), that "it is patent that [article 15] is punitive in nature" and that it 
serves as an alternative to court-martial. Delaney was charged with obstructing justice 
by interfering with an article 15 proceeding. In defense he claimed that only inter-
ference with a formal judicial proceeding could constitute obstruction of justice, and 
that article 15 did not give rise to such proceedings. The Court of Military Review 
disagreed on both points. 
96. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
97. 407 U.S. at 33. 
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counsel is unclear. First, Argersinger arose under the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and presents a binding inter:-
pretation of the sixth amendment only to the extent that the Su-
preme Court has incorporated the sixth amendment into the four-
teenth. There are some grounds for arguing that imprisonment is 
irrelevant under the sixth amendment per se. The opinion, like the 
opinion in Gideon v. Wainright,98 is cast in terms of "fundamental 
rights"99 and the prerequisites of a "fair trial"100-terms directly 
related to due process of law but unrelated to the presence or absence 
of a "criminal· prosecution," the sole requirement for a right to 
counsel expressly stated in the sixth amendment. Thus, it is possible 
that the imprisonment test simply identifies those situations in which 
the fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"101 
demand the provision of counsel under the due process clause.102 To 
the extent that the right to counsel in article 15 proceedings depends 
only on the requirements of the sixth amendment, and not upon 
whether lack of counsel would be a deprivation of due process, im-
position of a sentence of imprisonment may be irrelevant.103 
Even if A rgersinger was an interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment, it did not require a sentence of imprisonment as a precondi-
tion of the right to counsel. The Court expressly reserved decision 
on instances in which the accused is not sentenced to jail: ''We need 
not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards 
the right to counsel where loss ·of liberty is not involved, however, 
for here, petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail."104 It is thus possible 
that an article 15 defendant may have a right to counsel even if not 
sentenced to correctional custody, and even if correctional custody is 
not considered imprisonment. 
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, found no convincing 
reason to draw the line at imprisonment: "The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee that property, as well as life and liberty, may 
not be taken from a person without affording him due process of law. 
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis for distinguish-
ing between deprivations of liberty and property."105 Thus, although 
98. 372 U.S. 335 (1973). 
99. 407 U.S. at 32. 
100. 407 U.S. at 31. 
101. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
102. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 395 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1968): "It is the 
likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a 
crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a 
feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the constitu-
tional safeguards of due process." 
103. There may indeed be an independent right to counsel under the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment, however. See note 85 supra. 
104. 407 U.S. at 37. 
105. 407 U.S. at 51. Justice Powell would not extend the right to all cases involving 
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the Supreme Court has not yet required counsel in nonimprisonment 
cases, there is a sound basis for arguing that the right may eventually 
be further extended. 
The Court of Military Appeals, in a decision on a service mem-
ber's right to counsel handed down after A rgersinger, failed to recog-
nize that the Supreme Court did not rule that a sentence of imprison-
ment is required to invoke the protection of the sixth amendment. 
United States v. Alderman106 held that Argersinger applies to sum-
mary courts-martial; the imposition of a sentence of confinement, 
which the court held equivalent to imprisonment, thus triggered a 
right to counsel.107 Mere restriction, however, which results only in 
a " 'deprivation of privileges,' "108 was not held to be imprisonment 
and so did not require provision of counsel. The court apparently 
ignored or misread the Supreme Court's caveat in Argersinger, hold-
ing that "[t]he Court's repeated reference to actual confinement 
implies that a trial resulting in other types of punishment does not 
require appointment of counsel for the accused."109 
Even if a sentence of imprisonment is or becomes a prerequisite 
of the sixth amendment right to counsel, however, strong arguments 
can be made that the imposition of correctional custody under article 
15 is tantamount to imprisonment. 
The. characterization of correctional custody as imprisonment 
was discussed in United States v. Shamel,11° the only case to deal 
directly with a right to counsel under article 15. The petitioner, a 
defendant in a summary court-martial, argued that admission of 
evidence that he had served thirty days of "correctional custody" 
under article 15 was reversible error because he had been denied his 
imprisonment. He favors a case-by-case approach that would weigh the complexity of 
the charge, the probable sentence, and individual factors such as the competency of the 
defendant. 407 U.S. at 64. 
106. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). 
107. See also Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 
43 U.S.L.W. 2045); Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973). 
We find the differences between courts-martial and civilian criminal trials to be 
much less significant than the similarities between the two types of proceedings, 
at least with respect to the Sixth Amendment. Both types of proceedings may 
lead to deprivation of liberty as well as property. Both generate potentially severe 
social stigma. Both have significant repercussions beyond their immediate impact, 
in particular in the area of future employment. We have been pointed to no 
convincing reason why Argersinger v. Hamlin, • • • with its rejection of the 
distinction between petty and serious crimes should not establish the framework 
for Sixth Amendment analysis of military proceedings. 
Betonie v. Sizemore, No. 73-3015, slip op. at 5411 (5th Cir. July 5, 1974) (excerpted in 
43 U.S.L.W. 2045). 
108. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 302, 46 C.M.R. at 302, quoting United States v. Modessett, 9 
U.S.C.M.A. 152, 154, 25 C.M.R. 414, 416 (1958). See text accompanying notes 126-27 
infra. 
109. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 301, 46 C.M.R. at 301. 
110. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 47 C.M.R. 116 (1973). 
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constitutional right to counsel during the article 15 proceeding. 
Although the court refused to hold that Argersinger required the 
recognition of a right to counsel in an article 15 proceeding, the 
three justices were unable to agree on a single rationale for their 
decision. Writing for the court, Judge Quinn reasoned that Arger-
singer was not controlling because correctional custody was not 
imprisonment. He analogized correctional custody to military re-
striction111 or to detention of a student after school hours,112 rather 
than to the imprisonment of a civilian or to military confinement. 
Judge Duncan, in dissent, argued that the substantial similarity of 
correctional custody and confinement mandated the extension of 
the right to counsel to any article 15 proceeding resulting in correc-
tional custody.113 Chief Judge Darden merely cited his dissent in 
Alderman, in which he argued that the military court should not 
follow Argersinger because the Supreme Court did not affirmatively 
indicate that the decision was clearly applicable to the military.114 
He acknowledged, however, that if Argersinger did apply to summary 
courts-martial it would be difficult to argue against a requirement 
of counsel in article 15 proceedings that may result in correctional 
custody.115 Thus, two of three judges (Duncan and Darden) believed 
that correctional custody was a form of imprisonment that would 
trigger a right to counsel under Argersinger, and two judges (Duncan 
and Quinn) acknowledged that Argersinger was in fact the applicable 
standard. 
Although the contortions of the court in Shamel indicate that the 
analogy is not ·without difficulty, correctional custody under article 
15 strongly resembles military confinement, which was held to be 
imprisonment in United States v. Alderman.116 
111. See text accompanying note 108 supra and text accompanying notes 126-27 
infra. 
112. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 362, 47 C.M.R. at 117. 
113. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 363-64, 47 C.M.R. at 118-19. 
114. United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 309, 46 C.M.R. 298, 309 (1973). 
Judge Darden's argument was that the separation between the civilian and military 
systems of justice requires that the decisions of the Supreme Court not be given decisive 
weight in the military context unless specifically made applicable to the military. 
22 U.S.C.M.A. 307-09, 46 C.M.R. 307-09. This argument, however, appears to have been 
foreclosed in United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). See 
text accompanying notes 53-56 supra. 
115. While it may be argued that counsel should be required for summary 
courts-martial since they constitute criminal convictions and not for Article 15 
proceedings as they are non-judicial and corrective in nature, the effect of con-
finement under the former and correctional custody under the latter is difficult 
to distinguish •••• Consequently, I would have difficulty in sustaining the posi-
tion that while counsel must be provided before summary courts-martial, they 
may be dispensed with in Article 15 proceedings that may result in correctional 
custody. 
22 U.S.C.M.A. at 308 n.l, 46 C.M.R. at 308 n.l. See Leonhardt, Nonjudicial Punishment 
Under the New Article 15-An Explanation, 17 JAG J., Feb.-March 1963, at 25, 33. 
116. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See text accompanying notes 106-09 
supra. 
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Confinement differs little from a civilian jail sentence. Army 
regulations provide for confinement sentences to be served in any 
federal penal or correctional institution, as well as in military 
facilities.117 Confined army personnel, like civilian prisoners, serve 
their sentences in minimum, medium, or maximum custody.118 
Those in minimum custody normally can be employed or trained 
outside the confinement facility under minimum supervision.110 
Those in maximum custody can be employed only inside the con-
finement facility; an armed guard must accompany them when they 
are outside of the facility.120 Locked cells house all army prisoners,121 
and each prisoner engages in individually tailored correctional treat-
ment activities, primarily job training and employment.122 
The physical restrictions that an article 15 proceeding may im-
pose are arrest in quarters,123 restriction to an area,124 and correc-
tional custody.125 Arrest in quarters and restriction to an area are 
not analogous to confinement because they are "enforced by a moral 
obligation rather than by physical means.''126 Although the severity 
of the restraint varies depending upon its duration and the geo-
graphical limits it sets,121 restriction to an area is the least harsh 
physical restraint possible under an article 15 proceeding. Neither 
arrest in quarters nor restriction to an area seems severe enough to 
constitute "imprisonment" as the term was used in Argersinger. 
By contrast, correctional custody is an enforced physical re-
straint128 that is similar to confinement. There are some differences; 
for example, time spent in correctional custody does not extend the 
tour of duty of army personnel,129 as does time spent in confine-
ment;130 army personnel in correctional custody may perform their 
normal work during normal duty hours;131 they may also receive 
117. Army Reg. 190-4, fJ 1-3a(l) (Change 4, June 1971). 
118. Army Reg. 190-4, 1111 4--la(2)•(4) (Change 5, Jan. 1972). 
119. Army Reg. 190-4, fJ 4--la{2) (Change 5, Jan. 1972). 
120. Army Reg. 190-4, fJ 4--la(4) (Change 5, Jan. 1972), 
121. Army Reg. 190-4, 11 6-3 Oune 1969). 
122. Army Reg. 190-4, ,r 3-lb (Change 3, March 1971). 
123. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b)(l)(B)(i) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 11 131b(l)(b)I (for officers 
only). 
124. IO U.S.C. § 815(b)(l)(A) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 'J 13lb(l)(a) (officers); 10 
U.S.C. §§ 815(b)(2)(F), {H)(vi) (1970); MCM, supra, 1111 13lb(2)(a)6, (b)6 ("other 
personnel''). 
125. IO U.S.C. §§ 815{b)(2)(B), (H)(i) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 11,1 l3lb(2)(a)2, (b)2 
(nonofficers only). 
126. MCM, supra note I, 11 131c(3). 
127. Id. 11 13Ic(2). 
128. Id. 11 131c(4). 
129. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-Sc(l) (Change 12, Dec. 1973). 
130. IO U.S.C. § 972 (1970). 
131. Army Reg. 27-10, 11 3-8c(2)(f) (Change 12, Dec. 1973). 
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certain privileges not available in confinement.132 Nevertheless, cor-
rectional custody is a substantial deprivation of liberty. While the 
army declares that it is not confinement and that persons so 
punished should not be considered prisoners,133 the navy holds 
"[t]he status of correctional custody prisoners [to be similar] to that 
of sentenced prisoners."134 The UCMJ states that "'correctional 
custody' is the physical restraint of a person during duty or nonduty 
hours and may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or hard labor."135 
Various service regulations offer further evidence that the phys-
ical constraints of correctional custody are as severe as those of im-
prisonment. The army requires that correctional custody be served 
in a separate facility that prevents contact with other personnel.136 
Individuals under such custody must spend all nonduty hours, in-
cluding nights, weekends, and holidays, in the correctional facility.137 
The facility should be "austere and conducive to the rigorous and 
purposeful correction of these persons."138 Heavy wire screening or 
other sturdy material often covers windows,139 and unarmed guards 
may control the movement of individuals under custody.140 Although 
the army and the navy attempt not to place persons in correctional 
custody in the same stockades as those under confinement,141 separate 
placement is not required by the UCMJ.142 Moreover, the maximum 
punishment for escape from correctional custody is the same penalty 
that a service member faces if he escapes from confinement or breaks 
arrest.143 Finally, there is evidence that Congress enacted article 15 
to allow commanders to impose "increased pun~hments substantially 
132. Army personnel undergoing correctional custody are authorized to wear 
insignia, decorations, and badges, and they cannot be required to wear any markings that 
would identify them as prisoners. They are authorized and required to salute when 
appropriate. Army Pamphlet 27-4 [hereinafter Army Pam.], ,i 16 ijune 1972). 
133. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-8c(2)(c) (Change 12, Dec. 1973). 
134. United States v. Shamel, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 364, 47 C.M.R. 116, 117 (Duncan, 
J., dissenting), quoting Department of the Navy Corrections Manual ,i 109(4) ijune 
1972). 
135. IO U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,i 13lc(4). 
136. Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 13b. 
137. Id. 11 10. 
138. Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 14. See also Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-8c(2)(d) 
(Change 12, Dec. 1973). 
139. Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 15b. 
140. Id. 
141. The army provides that correctional custody will not be served in a facility 
utilized for confinement of military prisoners. Army Reg. 27-10, ,i 3-8c(2)(c) (Change 12, 
Dec. 1973); Army Pam., supra note 132, ,i 13a. The navy provides that correctional 
custody may on occasion be served in confinement facilities. Regulations Supple-
menting the Manual for Court-Martial, Manual of the Judge Advocate General of the 
Navy § 010le(2) (Change 4, Nov •. 1973). 
142. 10 u.s.c. § 815(b) (1970). 
143. 10 U.S.C. § 895 (1970); MCM, supra note 1, ,i 174. 
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the same as those now within the punitive authority of a summary 
court-martial.''144 
The similarity of correctional custody to confinement indicates 
that Judge Quinn's analysis in Shamel was erroneous and that Judges 
Duncan and Darden were correct in concluding that correctional 
custody is imprisonment. Argersinger thus requires that a service 
member be given a right to counsel in an article 15 proceeding that 
results in correctional custody. 
Arg~rsinger, however, left unsettled the question whether "right 
to counsel" requires the appointment of a fully trained attomey-at-
Iaw. Although the term apparently refers to representation by a 
lawyer, a substantial number of federal and military court decisions 
have held that the military can comply with the sixth amendment by 
providing the accused with nonlawyer counsel.146 
The cases that reached this result involved challenges to article 27 
of the UCMJ, which allowed appointment of nonlawyer counsel at 
special courts-martial.146 Kennedy v. Commandant141 ruled on the 
propriety of appointment of a nonlegally trained officer to defend 
an indigent service member. Kennedy did not contend that his ap-
pointed counsel was inadequate or ineffective. He argued instead 
that appointment of a nonlegally trained officer was a per se violation 
of his sixth amendment right. The court held "that the qualifications 
for counsel prescribed by Congress in article 27 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice fully comply with the right to counsel require-
ments of the Sixth Amendment."148 The Court of Military Appeals 
reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Culp.140 
144. Kuhfeld Testimony, supra note 94, at 5. 
145. E.g., Angle v. Laird, 429 F.2d 892, 895-96 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 918 (1971); Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 892, 900 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U:S. 934 (1969); Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1967); 
Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1945); Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528, 
531-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 
199, 216, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428 (1963). 
146. See United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 217, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428 (1963). 
147. 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967). 
148. 377 F.2d at 343. 
The precedential value of Kennedy has been weakened in two respects. First, the 
case was effectively overruled in 1968 by an amendment to the UCMJ that requires 
legally trained counsel at a special court-martial except where precluded by "physical 
conditions or military exigencies." IO U.S.C. § 827(c)(l) (1970); MCM, supra note 1, 
11 6c; see H. MOYER, supra note 28, at 388-89. Second, the result in Kennedy was 
reached in part because the maximum punishment involved was confinement for six 
months, see IO U.S.C. § 819 (1970); MCM, supra note I, 11 15b, a penalty that the 
court termed "nevertheless as and for a misdemeanor under the civil law." 377 F.2d at 
343. At that time-before Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), had been dccided-
"it [was] an open question whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is applicable 
in misdemeanor cases." 377 F.2d at 343. To the extent that the court relied on the 
felony-misdemeanor distinction discarded in Argersinger its opinion lacks prccedential 
value. 
149. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963). Each of the three judges in Culp 
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It is difficult to accept the view that a nonlawyer officer can ade-
quately protect the rights of a service member. As Judge Ferguson 
stated in his concurring opinion in Culp: 
An officer of the armed services of necessity cannot receive the train-
ing required to perform adequately as counsel for an accused. At the 
most, he receives a general orientation course in military law during 
his attendance at various service schools or takes a few sub-courses in 
various aspects of its administration. At no time is he subjected to 
the rigorous and intensive process which fits one to become the advo-
cate of an individual enmeshed in the toils of the criminal law. To 
me, it is just unthinkable to conclude that the best intentioned lay-
man can be taught by attendance at a few generalized lectures to 
become a capable representative of another in a criminal prosecu-
tion. The argument is the same as if one taking a course in business 
law attempted to represent a large corporation in a merger or anti-
trust proceedings. And, as military appellate authorities well know, 
the result usually looks like something intended for entertainment 
at a church social.150 
Persons with practical experience in the system of military justice 
echo Judge Ferguson's opinion. One commentator has recently 
remarked that "[most] officers have only the haziest notion about 
what the code is all about, and if you can find one officer in ten who 
has actually read fifty pages of the code, the Manual or the Handbook 
you are extremely lucky."151 
The argument that the right to counsel requires provision of 
trained lawyers is supported in the opinions of the Supreme Court. 
In Powell v. Alabama,152 for instance, the Court stated: 
had a different reason for upholding the use of nonlawyer counsel. Judge Kilday felt 
that the sixth amendment right to counsel did not apply to the military at all. 14 
U.S.C.M.A. at 215-16, 33 C.M.R. at 427-28. Judge Quinn believed that nonlawyers 
provided the service members with adequate representation. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 217, 33 
C.M.R. at 429. Judge Ferguson believed that the rights of the accused had not been 
violated because he had chosen to be represented by nonlawyers. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 219, 
33 C.M.R. at 431. 
150. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 219-20, 33 C.M.R. at 431-32. Judge Ferguson stated additional 
reasons for his reservations on the adequacy of nonlawyer representation: 
Aside from the inability of an officer counsel to perform his duties because of 
lack of proper grounding in law, there is also the important question of the ethical 
responsibilities imposed by our profession upon its members. Laymen will never 
understand an attorney's devotion to the interests of an "obviously guilty'' client or 
the single-minded loyalty to the latter's cause which almost unexceptionally char-
acterizes the practice of law. Too often, it must seem to the officer untrained in 
the law that his duty lies in the direction of the armed force to which he belongs 
rather than to the accused whom he represents, and there has not been inculcated 
in him any of the principles which so naturally form a part of the legal profession 
and which have impenetrably shielded the client's cause through the ages. It is 
difficult enough for a military lawyer to withstand the pressures exerted against his 
principal in the name of discipline and authority. 
14 U.S.C.M.A. at 220, 33 C.M.R. at 432. 
151. Sherman, The Right to Competent Counsel ••• in Special Courts Martial, 54 
A.B.A.J. 866, 869 (1968). 
152. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did 
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelli-
gent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, 
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. 
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of 
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and con-
victed upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue 
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence.153 
In Gideon v. Wainwright154 the Court was more explicit: 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in 
ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions 
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive 
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals 
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble 
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to 
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.155 
If "the intelligent and educated layman" is viewed as incompetent 
to represent himself, such a layman necessarily cannot be considered 
adequate counsel for another.156 
It should also be noted that the military is compelled to provide 
lawyer-counsel at interrogations prior to adjudicatory proceedings,107 
in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona.158 It would be anomalous to hold that the military is not 
constitutionally compelled to provide lawyer-counsel at the criminal 
trial itself. ' 
Even if it is held that appointment of lawyer-counsel at a mili-
tary criminal proceeding is not necessary, an indigent has the indis-
putable right to ·the "effective assistance of counsel.''159 At a mini-
153. 287 U.S. at 68-69; accord, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972). 
154. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
155. 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added). 
156. Law students under faculty supervision should be allowed to serve as counsel, 
however; the supervision would ensure that the accused would have representation by 
an individual with sufficient skills. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
157. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). 
158. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
159. See, e.g., Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Application of Stapley, 
246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965); United States v. Colarusso, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 39 
C.M.R. 94 (1969); United States v. Evans, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 39 C.M.R. 3 (1968); United 
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mum this right entitles the accused to the appointment of a person 
competent in military law. Both military and federal courts have 
found a denial of an accused's sixth amendment right when the 
counsel appointed to represent the accused lacked sufficient compe-
tence.160 In Application of Stapley,161 for instance, two nonlawyer 
officers were appointed as counsel in a special court-martial for a 
nineteen-year-old soldier accused of fraud in the issuance of checks. 
One officer was a veterinarian with only two days of training in mili-
tary law, and the other officer was a second lieutenant who had 
studied the UCMJ in a Reserve Officer Training Corps program but 
who had neither special knowledge or ability in military law nor 
practical experience in legal matters or procedures generally. The 
officers advised the accused to plead guilty to the charges against him. 
Although the court admitted the good faith of both officers, it held 
that their representation did not satisfy the requirements of the 
sixth amendment: 
[Minimal] requirements of due process and the Sixth Amendment are 
not satisfied by the assignment as counsel to an accused of officers 
with substantially no experience, training or knowledge in the field 
of law, either military or civilian .... [W]ith the increasing personnel 
in the military service, the rapidity and ease of transportation and 
the training facilities and techniques readily available for special-
ized training or experience, it is no longer either reasonable or 
necessary, if it ever were, to deem any officer qualified to act as 
defense counsel for an accused merely because he is an officer.162 
. 
The argument must be met that requiring appointment of 
trained counsel _in all article 15 proceedings imposing correctional 
custody would place too heavy a burden on the resources of the 
military justice system. Predictions that it will be impossible to pro-
vide the lawyers necessary to afford basic procedural protections have 
been made in the past, however, even with respect to protections 
contained in the UCMJ,163 and they have proved to be inaccurate.164 
States v. Home, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 26 C.M.R. 381 (1958); United States v. Allen, 8 
U.S.C.M.A 504, 25 C.M.R. 8 (1957). 
160. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 
F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965); 
United States v. Colarusso, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 39 C.M.R. 94 (1969) (sixth amendment 
right not mentioned but conviction reversed because defendant's appointed counsel had 
not objected to inadmissible evidence); United States v. Evans, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 39 
C.M.R. 3 (1968) (appointment of ineffective counsel constitutes reversible error); 
United States v. Henn, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 124, 32 C.M.R. 124 (1962); United States v. 
Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958). . 
161. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). 
162. 246 F. Supp. at 321. 
163. See Richardson, A State of War and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 47 
A.B.A.J. 793 (1961). 
164. See Cobbs, The Uniform Code of Military Justice in Wartime-Another View, 
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Furthermore, counsel would be required only if the service 
member is sentenced to correctional custody, which occurs infre-
quently.165 In accordance with Argersinger the commanding officer 
would have to determine the need for counsel before the commence-
ment of proceedings by reviewing the evidence to ascertain if correc-
tional custody is a likely punishment. Overcaution might boost the 
number of counsel needed to a number greater than one might 
expect from the frequency of the imposition of correctional custody. 
However, as noted above,166 counsel is already provided to every 
service member charged with a minor violation to give him assistance 
in making the election benveen proceeding under article 15 or under 
a court-martial. Since this lawyer must become acquainted with 
the case in order to give adequate legal advice, provision of counsel 
for the article 15 proceeding should not increase significantly the 
strain on the legal departments of the services. 
A final argument of those opposed to provision of counsel under 
article 15 may be that a service member waives his right to counsel 
by electing to submit to an article 15 proceeding rather than a 
court-martial, in which counsel is appointed.167 The difficulty with 
this argument is that a service membet who elects a trial by court-
martial exposes himself to greater maximum punishments than are 
allowed under article 15;168 he is thus coerced, or at least encouraged, 
not to assert his constitutional right.169 
An analogous situation came before the Supreme Court in United 
States v. ]ackson.110 The case involved a section of the Federal Kid-
napping Act that encouraged guilty pleas by providing that only a 
jury could impose the death penalty. The Court held that the 
section was an unconstitutional burden on the defendant's fifth 
amendment right to plead not guilty and on his sixth amendment 
48 A.B.A.J. 1123, 1124-25 (1962); Learner, Uniform Code of Military Justice: It Will 
Work During a State of War, 47 A.B.A.J. 1092 (1961). 
165. The frequency with which correctional custody was imposed under article 15 

















Telephone interview with the Office of the Clerk of the Court, Judge Advocate Gen• 
eral, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1974. 
166. See text accompanying note 13 supra. 
167. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. 
168. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
169. See Wood, supra note 69, at 7-8; Note, supra note 3. 
170. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
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right to a jury trial, stating: "Whatever might be said of Congress' 
objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the 
exercise of basic constitutional rights."171 
Several courts have adopted the Jackson rationale and have held 
that a service member does not waive counsel by electing to submit 
to a summary court-martial even though he could have had counsel 
by exposing himself to the greater possible penalties of a special or 
general court-martial.172 While the Court of Military Appeals has 
never addressed the issue in the article l!5 context, it probably would 
not sustain the waiver argument. 
The right to counsel is but one of the procedural safeguards that 
protect civilian misdemeanants but are denied to service members 
accused and punished under article 15. Those opposed to the 
extension of the right to counsel may thus argue that to recognize the 
right is to allow "the camel's nose to peek into the tent"-the right 
to counsel will be followed by the application of the right to cross-
examination, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and all the 
other procedural safeguards not present under article 15.173 The 
recognition of the full panoply of civilian safeguards, the argument 
goes, will rob article 15 of the procedural flexibility its purpose re-
quires. Two responses may be made to this argument. First, to the 
extent that procedural reforms are compatible with the function of 
article 15 and the unique needs of the military, their institution is 
desirable and probably constitutionally compelled. Second, each right 
must be judged on the basis of its particular constitutional status and 
the effect it would have on military operations. To transplant auto-
matically the arguments for extension of the right to counsel to the 
question of the applicability of the double jeopardy prohibition, for 
instance, would be to paint ,;vi.th too broad a brush. The right to 
counsel, as the Supreme Court has observed,174 is unique: It is funda-
mental to the right to be heard, and it must not be denied for less 
than the most urgent of reasons. 
171. 390 U.S. at 582, 
Although Jackson involved a capital crime, and its holding may arguably be limited 
to capital cases, the courts that extended the right to counsel to summary courts-
martial implicitly rejected such a limitation. See text accompanying note 172 infra. Cf. 
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
172, Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 496 (C.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Alderman, 
22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). 
173. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
174. See text accompanying note 153 supra. 
